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Abstract—In many interesting cases, the application of ma-
chine learning is hindered by data having a complicated structure
stimulated by a structured file-formats like JSONs, XMLs, or
ProtoBuffers, which is non-trivial to convert to a vector / matrix.
Moreover, since the structure frequently carries a semantic
meaning, reflecting it in the machine learning model should
improve the accuracy but more importantly it facilitates the
explanation of decisions and the model. This paper demonstrates
on the identification of infected computers in the computer
network from their HTTP traffic, how to achieve this reflection
using recent progress in multiple-instance learning. The proposed
model is compared to complementary approaches from the prior
art, the first relying on human-designed features and the second
on automatically learned features through convolution neural
networks. In a challenging scenario measuring accuracy only on
unseen domains/malware families, the proposed model is superior
to the prior art while providing a valuable feedback to the
security researchers. We believe that the proposed framework will
found applications elsewhere even beyond the field of security.
Index Terms—Network Security
I. MOTIVATION
This paper presents a method to identify infected computers
from their HTTP traffic, which can be collected on the network
perimeter, in the cloud proxy, or by an antivirus installed on
monitored computers. Although the model assumes visibility
of URL strings, which is decreasing due to the popularity of
HTTPs, we believe that the problem is still important and
interesting because: (i) the solution presented here is general
and the framework can be used for other problems with a
hierarchical structure; (ii) there is an established prior art
which is well developed and non-trivial to outperform; (iii)
URLs can be still collected directly at the endpoint before
being encrypted, for example by an antivirus engine, virtual
private network agents, by browser extensions, or by a white-
hat version of a man in the middle attack employed by some
companies.
The prior art on using machine learning (ML) on URL
strings is vast and relevant works are briefed in Section VI.
URL strings are challenging for ML models since they have
an internal structure consisting of several blocks, consisting
of a variable number of tokens including zero. Coping with
this variability is a challenge solved in the most prior art
by two orthogonal approaches: the first [17], [40], [22], [18]
converts the URL to a Euclidean space Rd using a set of
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human-designed features, which enables to use off-the-shelf
machine learning systems such as Random Forests or Support
Vector Machines. The second [33] avoids human-designed
features by converting the URL string to a matrix with one-hot
encoded characters.1 Although this allows using convolution
neural networks (CNN) or recurrent neural networks, they
have to learn how to parse and interpret the structure of the
string, which makes the learning unnecessarily complicated
and opaque since the structure is known.
This work tries to fix the shortcomings of the prior art and
extend it along three directions.
1) It presents a new model of URL strings, which (i) avoids
human design features like CNN, (ii) removes the need
to truncate or pad URL strings to fit the predefined
number of characters, and (iii) exploits the structure of
URL strings.
2) Unlike the most prior art modeling just individual URL
strings, here the model utilizes complete HTTP traffic
of a single computer. This gives it the ability to detect
infections that changes the distribution of traffic on
otherwise legitimate servers (e.g. adware) (which models
scrutinizing URL strings independently cannot do).
3) The hierarchy of data reflected in the model allows
to extract indicators of compromise and explain the
decision by identifying parts of a sample responsible
for positive classification.
The model is learned end-to-end from labels on the level
of a computer. The motivation for this is manyfold: (i) ac-
cording to Ker’s laws [13], [14] it should improve accuracy
of classification, which is based on more data; (ii) it moves
the granularity of labeling from individual URL strings to
the whole computer, which is simpler and more accurate;2
(iii) using multiple URL strings gives the classifier an ability
to detect malware, that communicates only with legitimate
servers but changes a distribution on them (see [27] for a
formal proof). This type of malware might be undetectable
by classifiers using only single URLs, as they look perfectly
normal.
The proposed model is experimentally compared to repre-
sentative work of prior art based on (i) hand-designed features
and random forests [22] (further called R. Forest model)
and (ii) convolution neural network [33] (further called by
1In this representation each column corresponds to one character from the
URL with the value one on the row with an index of the character and zero
elsewhere.
2Imagine that you know the computer is infected and you should label an
HTTP request to google.com. This request can be due to search invoked by
a user or by malware checking connection to the internet.
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Figure 1: Outline of a classifier for multiple-instance problems
proposed in [30], [9].
its name eXpose). Experiments are carried on public and
private datasets and they are designed to evaluate accuracy on
future and unseen malware samples (Grill test [10]), accuracy
in identifying the type of infection, and dependency on the
number of labeled samples.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews multi-
instance learning and particularly the method [30] on which
the proposed structured model is based. Section III describes
the proposed structured model of URL requests and the traffic
of computers. Implementation of the model and prior art,
datasets, and other experimental details are summarized in
Section IV. Experimental results are presented in Section V
and Section VII concludes the work.
II. MULTI-INSTANCE LEARNING
The problem of multi-instance learning (MIL) has been
introduced in [8] to solve the problem where a sample (in MIL
nomenclature called bag) was composed by a set of vectors
(in MIL nomenclature called instances) of an arbitrary number,
but of a fixed size (dimension). In pioneering work [8] it has
been assumed that there exist labels on individual instances,
but during training only labels on the level of bags are
known. Later works adopt a more general formulation of the
problem by [24], which assumes the sample to be a probability
distribution observed through a finite number of realizations
of a corresponding random variable. The very same work has
proposed to solve this problem using a combination of support
vector machines with a probabilistic kernel [6]. While their
classifier converges to the optimal detector, it does not scale,
as its worst-case complexity is O(l3b2), where l is the number
of samples in the training set and b is the average size of the
bag.
Refs. [30], [9] have independently proposed a simple clas-
sifier utilized in this work and outlined in Figure 1, which
according to extensive experiments outperforms most prior
art [30]. Denoting a single sample (bag) as b = {x1, . . . , xb},
xi ∈ Rd, the classifier is implemented by two feed-forward
neural networks fi and fb with an element-wise aggregation
g between them. The first network fi embeds each instance
xi into a k-dimensional space as fi(xi) = x˜i ∈ Rk, then
the element-wise aggregation combines all projected instances
{x˜1, . . . , x˜l} into a single vector x ∈ Rk of the same
dimension k, which means the whole bag of an arbitrary
number of instances is represented by a single vector x ∈ Rk.
Finally, the network fb provides the final decision.
The simplest implementation of this classifier uses single
non-linear layer with rectified linear units for fi, an element-
wise average for aggregation g, and finally a linear function
for fb. The final classifier can be written as
f(b) =
1
l
(
b∑
i=1
relu(θTi1xi), . . . ,
b∑
i=1
relu(θTikxi)
)
θb. (1)
Its main advantage with respect to prior art [1] is that since the
whole scheme is differentiable, all parameters including those
of the instance-projection function fi can be optimized using
stochastic gradient descend and its variants. Furthermore, it
has been shown in [27] that the construction is dense in the
space of continuous functions from probability measures over
Rd to R.
III. HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF A TRAFFIC OF A COMPUTER
This section describes an application of the multi-instance
learning approach to identify an infected computer based on
its HTTP network traffic observed on a network perimeter. The
explanation starts by modeling the traffic under the assumption
that each connection (message) is already represented by
a vector. Then, a model of URL is presented under the
assumption that each token within is represented by a vector.
Finally, a representation of a token is detailed. Putting all
three pieces together in reverse order gives rise to the full
model demonstrated in this work. It also shows the power and
flexibility of the modeling framework proposed in [29].
A. Embedding the network traffic of computers
The model of computers’ traffic is adopted from our
previous work [29]. It assumes that the network traffic
of a single computer can be modeled by a set of remote
servers (identified by a domain) with which the computer
has communicated with, i.e. to which it has issued a
request over HTTP protocol. In an example in Figure 2,
the computer is modelled by communication to three
domains evil.com, bbc.co.uk, and adnxs.com.
Similarly, each hostname is modeled by a set of requests
a particular computer has issued to the server. Again,
in Figure 2 the domain bbc.co.uk is modelled
by three HTTP requests bbc.co.uk/index.html,
bbc.co.uk/favicon.ico, and
bbc.co.uk/banner.jpg.
The proposed model simplifies the complexity of the net-
work traffic along two axes: (i) it assumes that domains do not
interact with each other, i.e. it cannot properly model mash-up
sites; (ii) it does not take the time continuity in the account,
which means that it cannot model time dependencies within
sequences. The first simplification is mainly technical, as it
is difficult to attribute an HTTP request in mash-up to the
originator. The second removes problems with catastrophic
forgetting and gradient explosion/diminishing in recurrent neu-
ral networks.
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Figure 2: Hierarchical model of the network traffic of a single computer. The computer is modeled by a set of remote servers
and each remote server is modeled by a set of messages (connections) from the given computer to it.
Despite these simplifications below experiments demon-
strate that the expressive power remains high to identify almost
all infected computers. We hypothesize, that it is because
the infected computer has either a very distinct probability
distribution of requests issued by malware (for example URLs
sent to a command and control server has a special format) or
the infection changes the distribution of types of servers with
which the computer interacts (for example adware downloads
a large number of ads albeit from legitimate services).
B. Embedding URL strings
The above model of computer traffic assumes that URL
strings are already embedded in a Euclidean space. Since this
is not straightforward, this section fills this gap by showing
how this embedding is implemented (and optimized) using
MIL formalism.
The URL string is viewed as a Cartesian product (concate-
nation) of models of hostname, path, and filename, and query
parameters respectively (note that path and query parts are
optional).3 Since each part can contain an arbitrary number
of tokens (parts of hostname, file path, key-value pairs), the
MIL framework is used again to handle this variability. Finally,
key-value pairs in the query part are represented as a Cartesian
product (concatenation) of representations of a key token and
a value token.
In URL string
3The scheme, port, and users are not represented, but they can be added if
needed.
http://evil.com/path/file?key=val&get=exploit.js
used in Figure 2, the hostname evil.com consists of tokens
evil, com (modeled by the first MIL problem); path and
filename consist of tokens path and file (modeled by the
second MIL problem); and finally query parameters consist
of pairs key=val and get=explit.js (modeled by the
third MIL problem). Pair get=explit.js is represented by
a key token get (one model) and value token explit.js
(another model). What remains to explain is how to embed
individual string tokens to Euclidean space, which is left to
the next section.
The proposed representation of URL strings and the network
traffic offers a lot of flexibility, as a representation of each
bag on each level of the hierarchy is parametrized by a feed-
forward neural network. Specifically (see Figure 2), functions
φD, φP , φK , and φV embed tokens of hostname, path, and
keys and values in query respectively. Similarly functions φQ,
φSLD, and φuser embeds higher-level concepts such as key-
value pairs in the query, URL strings, all traffic to a domain,
all domains the computer has contacted, and finally, f utilizes
the topmost embedding and classifies the computer. All feed-
forward neural networks φ· can contain arbitrary number of
layers and can implement recently proposed extensions such
as dropout [36], layer normalization [2], residual connec-
tions [11], etc. Needless to say that in the below experiments,
none of these extensions have been used and all functions φ·
were implemented as a single layer with 80 neurons and a relu
nonlinearity.
4C. Embedding string tokens
What remains to explain is how to embed individual string
tokens to Euclidean space. Although this is a subject of
extensive research in natural language processing and language
translation, not all solutions can be trivially adapted to the
domain of URL modeling, as the language of tokens in URLs
is several orders of magnitudes larger because a token can be
an arbitrary sequence of allowed characters including Unicode.
Since this problem is outside of the scope of this work, the
experimental section uses a very simple representation. Each
token is represented as a histogram of indexes of trigrams.
Since the number of trigrams can be very high (in theory
2563 as Unicode is converted to its byte representation) the
dimension is decreased by applying the modulo operation. In
the experimental section, the modulo is 2053. The rationale
behind this number is that (i) it is a prime, which is important
for the distribution in hashing and (ii) the number seems to be
a good trade-off between the complexity of the network and
accuracy of the solution.
We have experimented with an alternative representation
inspired by eXpose [33] , where a token is seen as a sequence
of one-hot encoded characters. This sequence is embedded into
Euclidean space by first applying the convolution windows of
size three and then reducing its output by elementwise average
and maximum. Despite the complexity of this solution is 4-5
times higher than that of based on trigrams, and it has required
the implementation of a custom convolution operator that can
handle tokens of different sizes, in our setting it was inferior
to an embedding based on trigrams. It might be possible to
improve this approach with sufficient tweaking, but we leave
this option to future work.
D. Extracting indicators of compromise
If we assume that the HTTP requests caused by malware
are added to those caused by user interaction, then infected
computers emit a mixture of normal and malicious requests.
This means that neurons inside the trained network should
be sensitive to malware tokens / URL strings / domains and
insensitive to those of clean computers. This means that each
neuron is a weak indicator of compromise (IOC). By inspect-
ing the tokens / URL strings / domains to which neurons on
different level of hierarchies are sensitive have several benefits:
(i) it helps to understand and verify the function of neural
network; (ii) it can reveal some phenomenons security analysts
were not aware of; and finally (iii) it can help explain the
decision and provide context, especially if the type of traffic
can be described in a human understandable language. Notice
that the hierarchical structure of the proposed model allows to
select the level of granularity (tokens / URL strings/domains)
a security researcher is interested in.
The exact algorithm extracting important parts of the traffic
at a particular level of detail works as follows.
1) Calculate the average output of neurons (at that given
level) on a normal traffic, further denoted by onormal.
2) Calculate the output of same neurons on the traffic of
infected computers, further denoted as {oiinfect}li=1. 4
3) For jth neuron (dimension of vectors o·), calculate the
normalized score as
oinormal,j
oinfect,j
. Then the URL strings /
tokens or domains with score much greater or much
smaller than one are the most characteristic for a given
type of infection. Note that scores around one are non-
indicative, as they are similar to the traffic of normal
computers.
The above algorithm assumes that the malware adds but
does not remove HTTP requests. We can imagine cases, where
such removal occurs, for example, if malware disables an anti-
virus engine, which then ceases updating itself. But missing
these updates are not indicative of infection since not all users
have an anti-virus installed. We, therefore, believe that the
assumption on additivity does not have a significant impact
on the extraction of IOCs.
E. Explaining the decision
Neural networks have a bad reputation of being a black-
box model without any possibility to extract any explanation of
their decision. In intrusion detection, this feature might prevent
widespread adoption, as people have a tendency not to trust
in systems that they do not understand. Moreover, providing
an explanation of the security incident to the analyst might
simplify and speed-up their investigation.
Similarly to the extraction of IOCs, the explanation exploits
the structure of the model and it also relies on the assumption
that malware can only add HTTP requests, but it cannot
remove them. 5 This has the implication that by removing
malware HTTP requests the decision of a neural network
can be changed from infected to clean. Although finding the
smallest number of such requests is likely an NP-complete
problem, a greedy approximation inspired by [35] performs
surprisingly well.
The explanation is iterative, where in each iteration a set of
requests to the same hostname causing the biggest decrease
of the classifier’s output are removed (in our implementation
positive means infected). The algorithm stops when there
are no further requests. The set of all removed requests is
grouped by their hostname and the returned explanation will
have the form: “This computer was found infected because
it has communicated with these servers”. This explanation
can be further augmented by annotating the type of traffic
to which neurons are sensitive to as described in the previous
subsection, and use the activity of these neurons to improve
the description.6
5Training set Testing set
#camp. #users #windows #domains #URLs #camp. #users #windows #domains #URLs
2 trojan 3 172 1562 6 6644 3 17 47 4 62
3 ad injector 46 15196 566709 451 9262340 33 1804 11684 214 89593
5 ransomware 1 15 181 1 270 1 4 5 1 7
6 malicious 18 14725 54533 594 422362 14 1442 3276 89 33773
8 PUA 21 18633 413314 189 5549824 14 2449 22098 140 251955
9 malware 3 35 10036 28 30363 2 4 405 12 1516
11 information stealer 13 5614 154761 175 1154500 7 526 7240 19 65701
12 mal. cont. dist. 18 8962 35993 716 121558 15 646 1379 138 6559
13 scareware 5 865 72784 12 77559 3 123 3646 7 3824
14 money scam 2 494 947 74 1220 2 23 42 20 53
15 anon. software 2 550 19368 69 31089 1 84 926 53 1716
16 banking trojan 2 6 5106 12 10578 1 2 294 10 620
17 spam tracking 8 1530 2860 305 20889 7 108 143 64 598
18 click fraud 8 584 3882 60 10344 5 34 186 23 385
19 cryptominer 1 9 18213 9 194173 1 3 524 9 6475
legitimate — 4450240 261823324 19306864 3597464926 — 1494471 13626770 2110986 177786802
Table I: Summary of infected computers and the infection types in the training set. "#camp." corresponds to the number
of families, "#users" to the number of computers, "#windows" to the number of 5-minute windows of traffic of a single
computer associated with the infection, "#domains" to the number of network domains and "#URLs" to the number of URLs
associated with a virus. Abbreviation "mal. cont. dist." stands for malicious content distribution and "anon. software" stands
for anonymization software.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
This section details: the implementation of the presented
models together with the selected prior art; the datasets used
for evaluation; grill-test used to estimate accuracy on unseen
malware; and finally the metric used to compare the classifiers.
Unless said otherwise, each experiment has been repeated ten
times.
A. The hierarchical model
The proposed hierarchical model based on multi-instance
learning was implemented in the Julia language [4] using
the Flux.jl [12] library for automatic differentiation and the
authors’ library supporting nested multiple instance learning
models and their Cartesian products available at https://github.
com/pevnak/Mill.jl. The experimental section compares two
models based on the proposed MIL framework.
MIL-5min is the classifier advocated in this work. It classi-
fies a computer based on all network traffic observed during 5-
minute windows, as has been described in the previous section
and as is outlined in Figure 2. Its main advantage is that (i) it
can be trained on coarse labels (whole computer vs. individual
URLs) and (ii) it has more information (multiple URLs) upon
which it can base its decision.
MIL-URL is a submodule of the MIL-5min model providing
the decision on individual URL strings. It is outlined in the
upper part of Figure 2 showing the representation of URL
4Note that while onormal is a single vector with dimension equal to the
number of neurons, {oiinfect}li=1 is a set with a cardinality equal to the number
of URL strings / tokens or domains.
5The question underlining this assumption is whether interfering with user’s
HTTP requests can make the malware visible to the user, since the user might
notice that the device works differently, which might trigger his investigation
leading to the identification of infection.
6The explanation on the level of requests to servers has been shown in our
prior work in [29]. Due to privacy concerns, this work demonstrates this on
a publicly available CSIC [26] dataset on a lower level of tokens in URL.
strings. The rationale behind introducing this model is that it
allows direct comparison to the prior art, which works mostly
on individual URL strings. The main drawback of this model
is that it requires labels on the level of individual URL strings,
similarly to most of the state of the art. The comparison of its
accuracy to MIL-5min also shows that the drop in accuracy
by training on coarse labels is negligible.
Unless said otherwise, individual feed-forward networks, φ·,
consisted of a single layer of 80 neurons with ReLU non-
linearity. The aggregation of bags used mean and maximum
simultaneously, therefore increasing the dimensionality from
80 to 160. The rationale behind this was that both the mean
and the maximum aggregation functions have their advantages.
Mean is very good for the case when malware is abusing
legitimate services and infected computer exhibits change in
the probability distribution of contacted types of servers [27].
Maximum is good when malware contacts single or few
servers with a very distinct pattern, for example, a command
and control channel. Utilizing both aggregation functions
simultaneously provides the best of both worlds.
The last layer of the neural network is augmented by a
linear layer with 16 neurons, as computers were classified
into 16 classes according to the type of malware and one
class deeming the computer clean. The loss function was
the usual cross-entropy, with the only exception being that
the error on clean computers had a weight 1 − wpos, while
the error on infected computers had a weight of wpos. The
rationale behind this is that in real use, the detection system
will observe two to three orders of magnitude higher number
of clean computers than infected ones. A high false-positive
rate is therefore devastating as the network operator would be
flooded with false alarms. Unless said otherwise, wpos = 0.01.
The ADAM [15] stochastic gradient descent method with
default settings was used with batch size 2 × 1000 samples
when the sample was a computer (MIL-5min model) and
62 × 5000 samples when the sample was a single URL string
(MIL-URL model). The gradient descend was run for 50 000
iterations. Because loading the data was very time consuming,
the stochastic gradient descends used a circular buffer of size
5, which means that every minibatch was reused 5 times. This
means that although the SGD used 50 000 steps, it has seen
only 10 000 "new" mini-batches.
B. Prior art
The proposed solution has been compared to two ap-
proaches — manually designed features used in a random for-
est classifier [22] (called R. Forest) and an approach based on
convolution neural network [33] (called eXpose). They were
selected as they represent state complementary approaches in
the prior art.
R. Forest classifier [22] uses a set of 398 hand-designed
features that are used with a random forest classifier to
separate URL strings of benign and malicious applications.
This approach is a good prototype of an industry workhorse,
as random forests are very robust and hand-designed features
allow to incorporate a lot of domain knowledge into the solu-
tion. The set of features proposed in [22] has been also used
for example in [18]. We have reimplemented these features
by ourselves, but thanks to authors we could verify their
correctness as authors have provided us with a set of URLs and
corresponding feature values. Random Forests used the imple-
mentation from https://github.com/bensadeghi/DecisionTree.jl
v0.8.1 in the Julia [4] language. In all experiments below,
each forest contained 100 trees with a maximum depth 30
and we have left all settings to default, which authors of [22]
confirmed as reasonable settings. To maximize the diversity of
trees within the forest, each tree has been trained on its random
subset of all training URLs. Although we were not able to train
the forest on all URLs in the training set, as we have been
limited by the 64Gb of memory of a single m4.x8 instance,
the model still used 2.4× more labeled samples than MIL-
URL classifier. In all experiments, we have trained each on
1 200 000 negative and the same number of positive samples.
eXpose [33], inspired by the success of convolution in
digital images, builds a classifier of URLs using a convolution
neural network. Specifically, eXpose truncates or pads all URL
strings to 200 characters such that they all have the same
size. Using a one-hot encoding of characters, a URL is then
converted into a binary matrix of size 200×256, which allows
for using a common stack of convolution, reduction, and fully
connected layers used in image recognition. eXpose was im-
plemented exactly as described in [33] with the only difference
being that samples have been classified into 16 categories
(clean + 15 malware categories) instead of benign/malicious.
eXpose was implemented in the Julia [4] language in the
Flux.jl [12] library for neural networks. We have used the
ADAM optimizer [15] with a minibatch of size 256 (mandated
by the limit of GPU memory) and it was allowed to train for
50 000 iterations on Amazon’s p2.xlarge GPU instance.
C. Corporate dataset
The main dataset of HTTP traffic was collected from more
than 500 large customers of Cisco’s Cognitive Threat Ana-
lytics (CTA) [37] during one month from 5th October 2017
till 3rd November 2017. The inherent limitation of the CTA
engine is that it discards 93% of the observed traffic and keeps
only the most suspicious part, which is 7%. Nevertheless, the
dataset still contains more than 1013 URL strings. The training
part contains all traffic collected in October and the testing set
contains traffic collected in 3rd November.
URL strings were labeled using Cisco’s internal blacklist
based on hostnames combined with regular expressions. The
blacklist is curated by senior security officers and it is ac-
curate in the sense that it contains minimal false positives
(connections made by legitimate applications but attributed
to the malware), but we admit that there might be false
negatives, i.e. it can contain URL strings made by malware
yet classified as legitimate. We argue that almost all datasets
will suffer from this type of error for two reasons. First, it
is at this moment impossible to obtain an accurately labeled
large dataset. Second, as was mentioned in the motivation
of this paper, even senior officers can have difficulties in
labelling some URL strings. A typical example is connections
to google.com made by the malware to check if it is
connected to the internet.
We have a preferred private blacklist over labeling using
the public services such as Virus Total (VT), since (i) they
are prone to false positives, (ii) we do not have sufficiently
high quotas to ask VT for every observed domain, (iii) it is
not trivial to infer labels from the results provided by Virus
Total answers [34], (iv) the labeling will suffer from the same
problems as our internal blacklist. Again, we do not think that
possible false negatives in the dataset make the results less
credible. Details and statistics about the dataset are shown
in Table I. Although the testing set does not contain any new
malware campaign, it contains approximately 12.57% domains
that are not present in the training set.
D. HTTP dataset CSIC 2010
The CSIC 2010 dataset [26] is a public collection of
URL strings created to test web attack protection systems.
It contains automatically generated web requests targeted to
an e-commerce web application developed by the Group of
Information and Communication Technologies at the Institute
for Physical and Information technologies.
The dataset contains 36 000 normal URL strings and more
than 25 000 anomalous ones including samples of following
attacks: SQL injection, buffer overflow, information gathering,
files disclosure, CRLF injection, XSS, server-side include,
parameter tampering, etc.
The dataset contains traffic only to a single domain from
a single computer, and the number of types of attack is very
limited. It, therefore, allows assessment of accuracy only on
individual URLs and it, therefore, does not mimic well the
scenario of interest of this work. On the other hand, it is
accurately labeled and its publicity is good for reproducible
science, which is difficult in the field of network security. The
experiments on this dataset presented in Section V-E should
be therefore treated as a supplement to main experiments on
the Corporate dataset which contains nine orders of magnitude
more URL strings.
7E. Grill tests
In this paper, all classifiers have been always evaluated on
future data to observe the effect of aging. Yet, since labels
in future data are created using the same blacklist as data
in the training set, they will be correlated as a large number
of domains and malware families will be present both in the
training and testing set. This makes it difficult to estimate how
well the classifier detects new types of malware, infections,
and migrations to new domains, which is precisely the type
of accuracy practitioners are interested in.
An experimental protocol originally proposed in [10] aims
to rigorously measure this type of generalization. Below,
we present its minor variation allowing a straightforward
comparison to the baseline, where the labels in the training
set are not manipulated. Bellow, the test is called Grill test
as a tribute to the main author and also because it puts the
classifiers on the edge of their capabilities.
The Grill test was executed on two levels: hostname and
malware families. For simplicity, it is explained for hostnames,
but its variant with malware families is straightforward.
Grill test assumes that each positive (malicious) sample is
attached to a hostname, which in the case of URLs is trivial.
In the beginning, all hostnames of positive samples from the
testing set are randomly divided into k folds (in this paper
k = 5). Then, k classifiers are trained, where the training set
of each classifier has either relabelled or removed samples
with a hostname matching those in the corresponding fold.
During classification, if a true label of a sample is positive, its
hostname has to belong to one of the folds7 and it is classified
using the classifier which did not have this hostname in its
training set. If a sample is negative, its hostname does not
belong to any fold and the output is calculated as an average
of all k classifiers. Thus although in the Grill test a total of
k classifiers are trained, they act as a single classifier and
positive samples are always classified using the classifier with
corresponding hostnames removed or relabelled in its training
set.
The rationale behind relabelling and removing is the fol-
lowing. Relabelling simulates a scenario where the blacklist is
not accurate and it contains false negatives, which means that
the training set contains malware samples labeled as benign.
Removing simulates a scenario, where a new malware family
appears after the classifier was trained, i.e. samples are not
present in the training set at all.
We believe that the Grill test is important for practitioners,
as it demonstrates how the classifier can detect new threats.
Moreover, since the protocol used in this paper preserves the
number of positive and negative samples in testing, it can be
directly compared to the case, where training and testing data
are shifted just by time.
The Grill test used a Corporate dataset with training data
collected in October and testing data in 3rd November.
7Note that this property is ensured by the fact that folds are created from
data in the testing set
F. Evaluation metrics
Although all classifiers are trained to solve multi-class
problems, they are firstly compared to a binary problem of
identifying clean vs. infected computers. This is because, in re-
ality, the false alarm / missed detection is more important than
incorrect identification of malware. On this binary problem,
classifiers are compared using the Precision-Recall curve [38]
known from information retrieval. The rationale behind this
is that unlike the ROC curve, it is sensitive to class ratio
and it shows how many infected computers can be identified
(recall) and what is the fraction of truly infected computers
out of the total number of computers classified as infected
(precision). Since most experiments are repeated ten times,
the plot contains average PR curves together with an area of
±1 standard deviation.
Precision-Recall curves (PR curves) are estimated and plot-
ted on two levels of granularity. The microscopic operates on
the level of individual URL strings, and its main purpose is to
observe how well are classifiers trained. However, for practical
purposes the macroscopic precision-recall curve on the level
of users is more important, where all traffic of a single user is
treated as a single sample. This shows how many computers
would require attention by a diligent staff investigating every
security incident. The decisions of classifiers on individual
URLs (MIL-URL, Conv. Random Forest) or on individual five-
minute windows (MIL-5min) are aggregated using maximum,
i.e.
max
i∈I
f(xi),
where f(x) is the output of the classifier on a sample x (URL
or five-minute window). An alternative to maximum aggrega-
tion is mean [13], which would correspond to counting alarms,
or an aggregation learned from the data [28]. But according
to discussions with security officers maximum well mimics
functionality of real intrusion detection systems triggering on
every alarm.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the experimental comparison of
the proposed classifiers MIL-URL and MIL-5min with the
prior art based on human-designed features and Random
Forests [22] (further called Random Forests) and the eXpose
classifier based on convolutional neural networks (further
called Convolution).
The classifiers are compared on four problems (or datasets).
The first, called classification in the future, corresponds to
the case when the classifier is trained on data from the past
(October 2017) and used on the data from the future (3rd
November 2017). This comparison mimics the application in
practice well. The second, called Grill test, uses modified
training as has been described above to estimate the accuracy
on unseen or unlabelled data. The third, called CSIC, is similar
to the first case but performed on the publicly available CSIC
dataset. The fourth problem uses the same scenario as the first
one but measures the accuracy of classifiers in identifying the
type of infection.
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Figure 3: Precision-recall curves of compared detectors on data from 3rd November 2017. Graphs in the left plot are calculated
from microscopic labels on individual URL strings whereas those in the right plot on macroscopic labels on individual
computers.
A. Classification in the future
Figure 3(a) shows precision-recall curves of classifiers of
individual URLs (therefore the URL-5min classifier is miss-
ing). The proposed MIL-URL model offers only a slightly
lower recall than the detector based on Random Forests, but
with markedly higher precision. EXpose based on convolution
neural networks is inferior to both R. Forest and MIL-URL.
Figure 3(b) shows precision-recall curves of the same classi-
fiers and also of the MIL-5min when one sample corresponds
to one computer — a scenario important for practitioners.
We observe that both MIL-5min and MIL-URL dominate the
prior art across all precision-recall space. Both classifiers keep
precision above 95 percent with a similar recall. Prior art
solutions have precision below 50 percent with worse recall.
The version of MIL-5min seems to be slightly better than
the MIL-URL classifier. This should not be surprising as
MIL-5min has more information about the infected computer
on which it can base its decision, as is suggested by Ker’s
laws [13], [14]. The superiority of MIL-5min is also important
for label acquisition, as to train this classifier, it is sufficient
to have labels on the level of 5-minute windows. These labels
are simpler to obtain and therefore more precise than on the
level of individual URLs.
The fact that Random Forests achieve good precision in
classifying individual URLs but worse performance when the
result is aggregated on the level of computers suggests that
they suffer from higher false-positive rates.8 To conclude, the
proposed solutions based on multi-instance learning seems
to be more precise in metrics better simulating practical
applications.
8While the loss in precision might seem to be puzzling, it is caused by
the presence of computers infected by a noisy but easily detectable malware.
When the level of sample granularity moves to a single computer, this large
number of malicious URLs (samples) collapses to one, but a single false
positive from a clean computer is still viewed as a single false positive.
B. Dependency on training set size
Models based on neural networks, particularly deep ones,
have a reputation of requiring a large number of samples. This
section demonstrates that in the problem of URL classification,
the Random Forest classifier requires even more. In fact, R.
Forest classifier used in above section (Figure 3) used 2.4×
more samples than MIL-URL classifier. To study how the
accuracy of different classifiers depends on the number of
samples, we have varied (i) the number of training steps for
the MIL classifiers and (ii) the number of samples per tree in
the R. Forest classifiers, as these two hyper-parameters control
the number of samples used in the training of corresponding
classifiers. All other experimental settings were kept the same
as above. Note though that in MIL-URL and in Random
Forests one sample corresponds to one URL string, whereas
in MIL-5min one sample corresponds to all URL strings col-
lected for 5 minutes. Figure 4 shows PR curves of classifiers.
We observe that the MIL-5min features the highest stability,
as model trained on 4 million samples has almost the same
accuracy as the one trained on 10 million samples used in
Figure 3. Contrary, the R. Forest classifier features the lowest
stability, as it continues to significantly improve even when
it uses more than (120) samples (12× more than MIL-5min
and 2.4× more than MIL-URL model). The eXpose classifier
was omitted from this study due to their poor performance and
very high computational complexity (see Section V-H below).
C. Generalization to unseen malware and new domains
In this section, the quality of detection of new host-
names/malware families of classifiers is, which shows how
classifiers can generalize outside the training set. Again, due
to poor performance and high computational cost, eXpose was
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Figure 4: Precision-recall curves of the MIL-URL, MIL-5min classifiers and Random Forests for different number of positively
labelled training samples. Since the MIL classifier had a fixed minibatch size of 1000 samples (MIL-5min) and 5000 samples
(MIL-URL), the number of training samples was controlled by the number of training steps.
omitted from this experiment.9
PR curves of the Grill-test are shown in Figure 5, wherein
the top row a sample corresponds to a single URL and in the
bottom row a sample corresponds to a single computer. We
observe that in both cases, MIL models feature better gener-
alization than R. Forest models. In almost all scenarios, the
behavior is as expected, where classifiers trained on all known
samples are better than classifiers with missing / mislabelled
samples. The exception is the R. Forest classifier evaluated
on the level of computers, where classifiers trained on data
where some malware families were missing or mislabelled,
the accuracy has improved. We believe that this is a result of
overfitting to some malware families prevalent in the training
set, yet rare in the testing set of 3rd November. Contrary to
our expectations, the model classifying 5min windows is less
robust than the model classifying individual URLs, which we
cannot explain at the moment, but it can be caused by a smaller
number of available training samples.
D. Multi-class
Table II shows the accuracy of eXpose, R. Forest, and MIL-
5min classifiers in identifying the type of infection of the
computer. In almost all cases (except Trojan, ad-injector, and
click fraud), the MIL-5min classifier is better than the prior
art, sometimes very significantly. In the cases where the MIL
approach is worse, it lags behind the best by less than 5%.
E. CSIC dataset
This section compares all of the three evaluated approaches
on the publicly available CSIC dataset of HTTP requests [26].
Since the dataset is rather small and it contains only bi-
nary labels and all HTTP requests target the same host
(http://localhost:8080/), the architectures of the
classifiers were mildly altered to reflect this.
Specifically, the MIL-URL model has modeled only the path
and query parts, as there is no reason to model the hostname,
9One experiment requires 5 classifiers and the experiment was repeated 10
times.
Types Conv. R. Forest MIL-5min
clean 99.7 99.9 99.9
trojan 34.0 99.9 95.1
ad injector 88.2 41.2 85.2
ransomware 0.6 57.1 100.0
malicious 6.5 4.4 84.4
PUA 92.4 73.5 99.5
malware 23.3 92.6 99.1
information stealer 72.9 72.5 90.9
mal. cont. dist. 8.7 4.7 71.5
scareware 73.1 99.6 99.9
money scam 0.1 25.0 41.7
anon. software 15.1 35.6 90.0
banking trojan 32.4 7.1 96.7
spam tracking 0.3 10.1 11.9
click fraud 1.1 91.6 87.8
cryptocurrency miner 55.1 99.0 99.8
Table II: Accuracy of identification of the type of infection
of the Convolution, Random Forest, and MIL-5min classifiers.
The accuracy is measured on the level of computers from the
traffic collected on 3rd November 2017. The best classifier
result for a given type of malware is in bold.
which is constant. The number of neurons in each layer was
decreased to 40 (from 80 used in the corporate dataset) and
the number of training iterations was decreased to 10 000.
Finally, the cross-entropy has classified into just two classes
(benign/malicious).
In eXpose, the hostname was removed from the URL string,
since it is constant across the dataset and since the maximum
length of URL is limited to 200 characters, keeping the
hostname would decrease the expressive power of the model.
Similarly to MIL-URL, the number of training iterations was
decreased to 10 000.
Random Forest classifier was left almost intact with the
exception that the training set for each tree was a random
subset of 80% of the training set. The rationale behind this was
to increase the diversity of the ensemble to improve robustness.
Figure 6 shows the average Precision-Recall curves of
10 repetitions, where all available data were randomly split
into a training set containing 80% of samples and a testing
set containing 20% of samples. The sampling was stratified,
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Figure 5: Precision-recall curves of MIL- 5min, Random Forest, and MIL-URL classifiers subjected to Grill-test on 3rd
November 2017. All precision-recall curves assume a sample is a user to allow their comparison.
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Figure 6: Precision-recall curves of the MIL-URL, eXpose,
and R. Forest classifiers on the CSIC dataset.
which means that the class ratio was preserved. On this
small problem, eXpose was mildly better in terms of recall
than the MIL classifier and the R. Forest classifier was the
worst. We believe that the superiority of eXpose is due to the
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Figure 7: Ratios of peak values of neurons of the last layer
before URL part aggregation for anomalous and normal data.
simplicity of this problem, specifically because the number
of possible attacks was much lower and attacks had very
distinct signatures and the problem is smaller by nine orders
of magnitude than previous problems in corporate networks.
F. Extraction of IOCs
Indicators of compromise were extracted as described in
Section III-D on the level of tokens in the path and in the
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Type Token Value
path "6909030637832563290.jsp.old" 0.999995
path "tienda1" 1.22634× 10−9
path "zarauz.jpg" 4.33613× 10−11
path "miembros" −7.82587× 10−11
path "imagenes" −0.857101
Table III: The contributions of the individual tokens to the
model prediction. Higher values mean more important tokens.
query. The extraction on the level of traffic to domains was
shown in [29] and we cannot repeat it here due to privacy re-
strictions on the Corporate dataset. Figure 7, therefore, shows
the score, i.e. ratio of the output of neurons on anomalous
and normal URL strings. According to these values, path
and values seem to be more important for the detection of
malicious URL strings than keys in the query string.
For path, the token with the overall highest output
was 6909030637832563290.jsp.old, for key
cantidadA and value Espriella+Morcossessionid%
3D12312312%26+username%3D%253C%2573%2563%2572%2569%
2570%2574%253E%2564%256F%2563%2575%256D%2565%256E%
2574%252E%256C%256F%2563%2561%2574%2569%256F%256E%
253D%2527%2568%2574%2574%2570%253A%252F%252F%2561%
2574%2574%2561%2563%256B%2565%2572%2568%256F%2573%
2574%252E%2565%2578%2561%256D%2570%256C%2565%252F%
2563%2567%2569%252D%2562%2569%256E%252F%2563%256F%
256F%256B%2569%2565%2573%2574%2565%2561%256C%252E%
2563%2567%2569%253F%2527%252B%2564%256F%2563%2575%
256D%2565%256E%2574%252E%2563%256F%256F%256B%2569%
2565%253C%252F%2573+%2563%2572%2569%2570%2574%253E%
3F. Although we do not know the precise meaning of the
key ("cantidad" is in spanish "amount, count, number"), the
value is a doubly-escaped, which after decoding (twice) using
the service https://www.motobit.com/util/url-decoder.asp
reads =12312312&username=<script>document.
location=’http://attackerhost.example/
cgi-bin/cookiesteal.cgi?’+document.cookie
</script>? suggesting a likely cookie stealing through
cross-site scripting.
G. Explaining the decision
The explanation algorithm described in Section III-E has
been used on the CSIC dataset on tokens of a filename
and keys and values. Again, the privacy restrictions on the
Corporate dataset prevent us from using it in this test. As
an example, the explainer is used on the positively classi-
fied URL string http://localhost:8080/tienda1/miembros/
imagenes/zarauz.jpg/6909030637832563290.jsp.old. The
contributions of the individual tokens to the prediction of the
model are listed in Table III. As can be seen, the most impor-
tant token is 6909030637832563290.jsp.old, which
nicely corresponds to indicators of compromise extracted in
the previous section.
H. Computational complexity
This section compares the complexity of all four models,
namely a time to train the model, to classify all URLs in traffic
Training time Classification time Model size
eXpose 11 500 107.3 12M
R. Forest 126 100 145.8 7.9M
MIL-5min 34 000 6.9 2.7M
MIL-URL 1 100 6.4 2.8M
Table IV: Training and classification times (in seconds) of
models used in experiments of this paper. The size of the
minibatches of MIL-URL is 2×5000 samples (URLs), that of
MIL-5min is 2 × 1000 samples (5 minute windows of users
traffic, each of which is on average 14 URLs), and finally that
of Convolution NN is 2×256 samples. The size of the training
set of Random Forest is 2×1.2·108 samples. The classification
dataset contained the traffic of 1000 infected computers, which
is approximately 81090 URLs.
of 5-minute windows of 1000 infected users (81090 URLs in
total), and also the complexity of the model, measured by
a size [32] of a serialized Julia. Since the serialized model
contains the data and necessary structures defining the model,
we believe it to be a good proxy for the size used in [32].
The training and classification times of the MIL and Ran-
dom Forest classifiers were measured on a single m5d.4xlarge
AWS instance (64Gb of memory, 16 virtual Intel Xeon Plat-
inum 8175M CPUs), the times of Convolution NN were mea-
sured on a single p2.xlarge AWS instance (60Gb of memory,
4 virtual Intel Xeon CPU E5-2686 CPUs with a single Tesla
K80 GPU). Times are measured end2end, which means that
they include all preprocessing with feature extraction in the
case of Random Forest included.
The measurements are shown in Table IV. We can see that
the solution based on eXpose is the fastest to train, which
is caused by the small size of the mini-batches mandated by
limited GPU memory and also by employing a GPU, which for
this type of task easily leads to 10 times faster training. On the
other hand, eXpose is the largest model and the classification
time is the second highest, caused by slow loading of data to
the GPU. Random Forest was the most expensive to train and
also the classification time is the highest, more than 20 times
that of MIL and 1.5 times that of eXpose.
The training time of MIL-URL is the fastest, while that of
MIL-5min is the second slowest. This discrepancy is caused
by the size of the mini-batches of 1000 5-min windows of
MIL-5min, which is approximately 50 000 URLs (opposed to
5000 URLs of the MIL-URL model). On the other hand, in
both cases, the classification time is more than an order of
magnitude faster than that of the prior art. Also, the model
is the lowest complexity as measured by the stored serialized
model size.
VI. RELATED WORK
The evolution of methods to detect malicious URLs follows
the evolution of machine learning. Early, but still used meth-
ods [17], [40], [22], [18] rely on human-designed features.
For example [17] uses the length of the URL, frequency of
selected characters or occurrence of special tokens in the query
part. For each type of features, it designs a method to detect
anomalies, such as the chi-square test for the frequency of
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characters. A detector for spam, phishing and malware in [5]
uses the number of, average length and maximum length of the
domain, path, and query tokens together with spam, phishing
and malware SLD hit ratio brand name presence. The most
complete set of features known to us [22], [18] was used in
the experimental section in the Random Forest classifier. The
feature set contains (i) characterization of distinct patterns in
the URL string, including the length of the URL, the vowel
ratio, the consonant ratio, the number of special characters (’!’,
’-’, ’_’, ’,’, ’@’, ’#’, ’%’, ’+’, ’:’, ’;’), the upper case ratio, the
lower case ratio, and the proportion of the digits; (ii) common
statistical features of domain names, including domain name
levels, character type distribution ratio, and top-level domain
name; (iii) the overall length of the path and the number of
directories; (iv) and finally filename suffix and its length.
Refs. [20] and [31] avoid the design of features by either
creating a dictionary of observed tokens or their 3–8grams.
With that, they represent the URL by their one-hot encoded
presence. These works build upon the progress of training
linear models with a large dimension on very sparse samples.
Recent advances in neural networks from vision and lan-
guage modeling were used in [33], [19], and [39], where the
URL is treated as a sequence of characters truncated to 200
characters, as according to the references 95% of URLs are
shorter. CNN from [33] is used in the comparison. Unlike the
proposed method it has to learn to parse the URL to utilize
the structure.
The closest work to this is [41] and our earlier work [7],
which divides the URL into a hostname, path and query mod-
eled separately either by a convolution over tokens embedded
to Euclidean space using word2vec [23] or by the multiple-
instance learning framework [30]. The proposed model can be
seen as an evolution that uses a more sophisticated model of
query and models all traffic of the computer instead of a single
URL (which gives the model ability to be trained from coarse
labels and to detect infections merely changing distribution on
otherwise legitimate servers).
In [21], URL features are supplemented by information
about the server, such as data from WHOIS, IP prefix, au-
tonomous system number, geographic location, and connection
speed. Although the presented model can be modified to use
these features, they were avoided since we wanted to compare
to the prior art on URLs only.
As some malware has a very specific header of the HTTP
request, Ref. [40] creates a template for each family and
measures the distance from it. Thus, it essentially builds
a 1-nearest neighbor classifier with a custom distance. The
proposed hierarchical models can include the model of HTTP
header, yet the data were not available to us and as mentioned
above, utilizing them would limit the comparison to the prior
art.
So far, we have reviewed models detecting individual URL
strings. Recognizing the deficiencies, in [3] the subject of
classification is a set of connections between the hostname and
a particular server. The representation is inspired by models
from computer vision, but it cannot be easily extended to
the traffic to multiple servers. A model for the same subject
is proposed in [16], but the scaling in higher dimensions is
dubious. Moreover, unlike the presented model both methods
rely on hand-crafted features.
The clustering of binaries executed in a sandbox based
on their URLs is treated in [25]. To calculate distance, it
is proposed to use a weighted sum of Levenstein distance
between strings, Jaccard index between parameters, etc. Since
the goal of the proposed work is classification, the distance
function of [25] is not well suited for this problem, as k-NN
or SVM classifiers do not scale.
Last, we mention our previous work [29], where the network
host is modeled by a set of domains and each domain by a
set of HTTP messages exchanged with it (see Section III-A).
While [29] requires URL strings to be described by a set of
features, whereas the proposed model extends it such that it
requires the representation of individual string tokens only (for
example by 3-grams).
VII. CONCLUSION
The main goal of this work was to replicate in the field of
network security the success of convolution neural networks
in computer vision and other areas in removing human-
designed features. This has been achieved by removing time
and spatial dependencies and by nesting multiple instance
learning problems. The proposed framework can classify a
set of all connections from a single computer while relying
on features describing only string tokens. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work of its type.
Experimental results have demonstrated that the proposed
model outperforms, sometimes significantly, the prior art in the
problem of identifying infected computers within a computer
network and classifying the type of infection.
We believe that the proposed approach will serve
as a blueprint approach, how domains with compli-
cated hierarchies can be elegantly handled by straightfor-
ward nesting of multiple-instance learning problems. We
have therefore released a library simplifying this task at
https://github.com/pevnak/Mill.jl. We also be-
lieve that there is a lot of space for further improvement, for
example by utilizing local dependencies by convolution.
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